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Financial constraints and real 
activity: a non-structural approach 





1.  Introduction and summary 
Understanding the causes and effects of financial constraints for firms is of key importance for a 
variety of policy issues. In monetary transmission theory, the credit channel is supposed to condition 
and amplify the “neoclassical” relative price effects of interest rate changes on firm activity. Monetary 
policy may affect the ability of banks to finance firms (bank lending channel), or else influence firms’ 
ability to attract external finance by affecting the value of their equity (balance sheet channel). Second, 
financial constraints on real activities form one crucial link that determines the real consequences of 
financial imbalances of various types: banking crises, asset price bubbles, or government debt. 
Ultimately, financial constraints due to asymmetric information are especially important for those 
future-oriented activities that deal with generating new knowledge: research, development and the 
introduction of innovative products and processes. These activities are fundamental to the long-run 
performance of any economic system. 
For all these reasons, the study of firms’ financial constraints at a micro level is a major topic on the 
agenda of central bank research. A recent coordinated research effort by the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) on the basis of large national balance sheet databases shows that financial 
constraints do seem to matter for firm investment and the monetary transmission process (see 
Chatelain et al (2003a) for an overview). However, unlike much of the literature on US firms, size does 
not seem to be a good indicator of informational asymmetries and the assorted financial constraints in 
European countries. Among some of the larger euro area countries - France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain - only Italian small firms show an excess sensitivity of investment with respect to cash flow.
3 
It is conceivable that the importance of financial constraints for the real activity of firms also depends 
on the financial system. Allen and Gale (2001) argue that intermediaries and markets may have 
different comparative advantages. A market-based system deals better with situations where 
innovations occur and where there is a fundamental diversity of opinion, whereas intermediaries are 
able to save transaction costs when a large amount of experience has been gained and things are no 
longer changing. The empirical patterns of financial constraints and their importance for monetary 
policy, financial stability and innovation and growth may therefore depend on economic institutions. 
This paper is part of a larger research effort based on large panels of survey data which aims to 
compare the significance of financial constraints for firm behaviour in (bank-based) Germany and the 
(capital market based) United Kingdom. With respect to the United Kingdom, we are able to explore 
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the database for the CBI Industrial Trends Survey (ITS), which is the most important survey for 
business cycle analysis in the United Kingdom. For the 11 years between January 1989 and 
October 1999, our cleaned unbalanced panel contains 49,244 quarterly observations on 5,196 firms. 
According to the CBI, the ITS represents around 33% of the total current employment within UK 
manufacturing. 
Apart from its size and coverage, the data set has two important characteristics. First, it contains many 
small firms, on which very little information is available from micro data sets based on quoted 
companies. More than 63% of the ITS observations refer to firms with less than 200 employees. 
Second, the data-set contains detailed information on financial constraints that firms face in their 
investment decisions. Notably, a number of firms (around 20.8% of respondents) explicitly state two 
things: that they are constrained by the lack of either internal or external financial resources, and that 
these constraints have an influence on their investment behaviour. 
This is exactly what the bulk of the empirical literature on financial constraints, following the seminal 
article by Fazzari et al (1988), tries to prove. The standard procedure in this literature is to split the 
sample by some criterion that a priori identifies firms as being financially constrained or unconstrained, 
such as size, dividend behaviour or the risk of default, and then to test whether the observed 
differences in investment behaviour between the two types of firm are consistent with what is to be 
expected from a better or worse financial standing in a situation of asymmetric information.
4 Armed 
with the CBI data, this complicated and very indirect procedure, heavily criticised on theoretical 
grounds by Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), seems to be unnecessary: a subset of respondents 
explicitly claims to be constrained. However, it needs to be examined whether they have told the truth, 
ie whether or not there is informational content in their assertions. If this is the case, we have the 
chance to take a closer look at the interrelationship between financial constraints and investment 
demand. 
Section  2 is dedicated to the presentation of our data set. The econometric part of the paper, 
Section 3, examines the informational content of our data on financial constraints. Our focus is on 
capacity adjustment, as the ITS data on capacity gaps, planned expansion and rates of capacity 
utilisation are especially rich. First, we look at the association between two types of constraints: 
capacity restrictions and financial constraints. Then we undertake a duration analysis with respect to 
spells of capacity constraints. Firms report whether their capacity is insufficient with respect to 
demand. Those firms which indicate financial constraints should take longer to close a capacity gap if 
there is informational content in their answers - either because they are less able to finance their 
investments or else because they have bigger gaps to fill. In fact, financially constrained firms do take 
longer to end a period of insufficient capacity. The paper ends with a conclusion in Section 4. 
2.  The data set 
The CBI Industrial Trends Survey (ITS) is a qualitative survey that looks at short- and medium-term 
trends in the UK manufacturing and processing industries. The survey is a postal questionnaire aimed 
at a senior level within firms and is usually completed by either the Chairman or the Chief Executive. 
The CBI produces both a monthly and a quarterly survey, the latter providing more in-depth analysis. It 
covers a wide range of subject areas including optimism regarding the general and export business 
situation, investment, capacity, order books, numbers employed, output, deliveries, stocks, prices, 
constraints to output, export orders, competitiveness regarding the domestic, EU and non-EU market, 
innovation and training. The quarterly survey is the empirical basis for our analysis. Mitchell et al 
(2002a,b) have used the ITS micro data to show that disaggregate survey-based indicators they 
developed can outperform traditional aggregate indicators. The full text of the questionnaire can be 
found in Wood (2001). 
According to the CBI, the ITS represents around 33% of the total current employment within UK 
manufacturing. Our research focuses on 11 years of data between January 1989 and October 1999. 
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The cleaned, unbalanced panel contains 49,244 quarterly observations on 5,169 firms. We exclude 
any divisions of a company, as their information might not be truly relevant to questions regarding size 
or financial constraints. Furthermore, we exclude all anonymous responses because these companies 
cannot be tracked over time. 
Apart from its size and coverage, the data set has a number of important characteristics. First, the 
survey consists of four employment size groups, the largest of which looks at small firms with less than 
199 employees. As can be seen in Table 1, 63% of the ITS observations refer to these small firms. 
Second, the ITS has a wide-ranging base of firms from the UK manufacturing and processing 
industries; Table 2 shows the breakdown of two digit SIC codes by observation. 
The question on constraints on investment is of key importance for our study. We therefore quote the 
exact wording here for the sake of convenience:  
 
Question 16c 
What factors are likely to limit (wholly or partly) your  
capital expenditure authorisation over the next 12 months? 
(If you tick more than one factor, please rank in order of importance) 
□  inadequate net return on proposed investment 
□  shortage of internal finance 
□  inability to raise external finance 
□  cost of finance 
□ uncertainty  about  demand 




Table 3 shows both the overall frequency with which firms cite a given constraint (any rank) to 
investment expenditure and the frequency with which this constraint was given the first rank. Firms 
had the opportunity to name more than one constraint on capital expenditure, but they were asked to 
rank the importance of their constraints. We interpret the answers to this question as information on 
marginal investment. For the entire sample, uncertainty about demand is the most common 
impediment mentioned by all firms. It is cited by most firms (55% of respondents) as a significant 
constraint over the time period we studied. An interpretation of these figures in the light of theory, 
however, has to take into account the possibility that many firms focus only on “downside risks”, such 
as an unanticipated decrease in demand, rather than on uncertainty in the sense of imprecise 
expectations. For a recent review of the microeconometric literature on investment and uncertainty see 
von Kalckreuth (2003a). The second most important constraint is inadequate net return, cited by 39% 
of firms as an important constraint. Other constraints seem to have been less important. Costs of 
finance were cited frequently in the early 1990s, but have been mentioned significantly less often 
since then. 
Turning to financial issues, we see that 4.3% of firms cite inability to raise external finance as a factor 
likely to limit their capital expenditure over the next 12 months. However, it is also interesting to note 
that only 1.96% mentioned this particular factor as their foremost constraint. 18.9% of firms cite 
“shortage of internal finance” as an impediment to investment, and for 13.6% of firms it is the most 
important barrier. 
For inferential purposes, it is important to know whether there is sizeable individual variation in the 
financing constraints data. Table 4 conditions on whether in the preceding period a firm reported either 
a shortage of internal finance or an inability to raise external finance, and it shows the transition to the  
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next period. It is easy to see that the reports on financial constraints are strongly autocorrelated. 
Among the firms that do not report financial constraints in a given period, a share of 87.6% will not 
report any in the next period either, and 12.4% switch to reporting constraints. But only 36.7% of the 
firms that report financial constraints in one period will state that they are unconstrained next time; the 
remaining two thirds will claim to be still constrained. However, the state of financial constraints is far 
from being determined by the state in the preceding period - there is a great deal of individual 
movement in both directions. 
3.  Is there informational content in the financial constraints data? 
As highlighted in the previous section, a sizeable proportion of firms in the CBI Industrial Trends 
Survey state that their investment is constrained either by insufficient internal funds or by the inability 
to raise external finance. These statements are interesting and potentially very rich: as we shall see 
below, they permit identification of the financial regime of a firm. Weighted averages of survey 
questions are often used for forecasting and evaluation purposes at a sectoral or macro level and in 
many cases turn out to be surprisingly accurate.
5 However, it is not clear a priori how well the survey 
responses reflect the individual economic situation of the answering firm. Therefore, we need to check 
the informational content of the statements on financial constraints at a micro level. In other words, we 
want to see whether the statements on financial constraints relate to other information in the data set 
in a way that is consistent with theory. 
3.1  The endogeneity problem 
This, however, is no easy task. Capital accumulation and financial constraints are determined 
simultaneously: financial constraints depend not only on the financial situation of the firm, but also on 
the size of the planned investment. 
With complete markets and a type of uncertainty common to all agents, the net present value of a firm 
does not depend on the way it is financed. The Modigliani-Miller separation theorem holds that a firm’s 
real capital allocation decision can be analysed independently of the financing decision - the structure 
of the asset side of the balance sheet is independent of the liability side. With asymmetric information, 
however, there will be a premium on external financing over and above a fair default premium which 
simply compensates for the fact that the debtor will not have to pay in certain states of nature. The 
creditor is less able than the debtor to evaluate the situation of the firm and the prospects of the 
investment project to be financed. The finance premium covers expected dead-weight losses caused 
by monitoring, costs of litigation, adverse selection and moral hazard. The important thing is that its 
size depends on the financial structure of the firm. Investment and the cost of external finance are 
therefore jointly endogenous. 
Graph 1, adapted from Bernanke et al (1999), shows that the costs of external finance depend on the 
difference between the actual capital demand and what can be financed internally. By means of this 
graph, we can interpret the responses to the questions on financial constraints in terms of three 
regimes which are ordered in a natural way: a state of no financial constraints, a state of limited 
internal finance (the firm needing external finance) and a state of unavailability of external finance. If a 
firm states that its capital expenditure authorisations are limited by a shortage of internal finance, it is 
saying that it has to pay an external finance premium because the internal resources are insufficient. 
And if it reports that no further external finance can be raised, the firm may find itself in the regime 
described by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981): at a certain credit volume, the interest rate cannot be raised 
beyond a certain value. Then the firm is credit-rationed. Under certain circumstances, this is the 
equilibrium outcome of a situation where the severity of the agency problems is a function of the 
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interest rate itself. In the graph, the existence of such a regime would make the schedule break off at 
some maximum interest rate.  
We see that shocks to the financial structure will affect real decisions and vice versa. In any equation 
describing the capital accumulation decision, the error term will be correlated with the financial 
constraints variable. If we had continuous variables describing the accumulation of capital, this 
problem could be resolved using instrumental variable techniques, such as the GMM method 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Breitung et al (2003) explore the simultaneity between 
investment decision and financial conditions by estimating a VAR on a large panel of German 
manufacturing firms. However, instrumental variable analysis is made difficult by the fact that the ITS 
data on investment and expansion are qualitative: we know whether or not the firm expands or steps 
up investment, but not by how much. 
We therefore want to test the informational content of the data on financial constraints by looking at a 
relationship where both lines of causality point in the same direction. To this end, we investigate the 
occurrence and the duration of spells of capacity constraints. 
3.2  Occurrence and duration of capacity restrictions 
If there are adaptation costs such as delivery lags or time to build constraints, the move to a higher 
desired capital stock will be spread over several periods. In order to achieve tractability, it is often 
assumed that marginal adaptation costs increase linearly with the size of investment.
6 Second, the 
external finance premium might also be an increasing function of the investment intensity. Creditors 
might want to give finance in instalments, cutting the project into several phases, in order to monitor 
feasibility and the willingness of the management to comply with the terms of the credit contract. This 
may induce a sequential and “evolutionary” development of a project from a smaller to a larger size 
even in cases where, in a world without information asymmetry, a massive parallel investment effort 
might have been optimal. In the extreme case, when a firm has no access to external finance, the 
amount of investment per period is quite simply limited by the firm’s cash flow. 
The ITS survey gives us information on whether or not a firm experiences capacity constraints in a 
given period by asking the following question: 
 
Question 14 
What factors are likely to limit your  
output over the next four months? 
(Please leave completely blank if you have no limits to output) 
□   orders or sales  □   skilled labour  □   other labour  □   plant capacity 
□   credit or finance  □   materials or components  □   other 
 
Both directions of causation between financial constraints and the expansion decision lead us to 
predict that a state of capacity restrictions is more probable and will be of longer duration if the 
respondent also reports financial constraints to investment. With a given marginal valuation of capital, 
a large external finance premium will induce the firm to spread investment over a longer time horizon, 
inducing and prolonging capacity constraints. On the other hand, with a given financial structure, a 
shock in the marginal valuation function will not only trigger financial constraints, but also lead to a 
longer adaptation process. Larger gaps simply take more time to fill. Below, we shall compare the 
occurrence and duration of capacity constraints for restricted and unrestricted financing, with a 
particular emphasis on the distinction between small and large firms. Our analysis shows that the 
financial constraints data actually do have informational content at the micro level. 
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3.3  Association analysis for capacity restrictions and financial constraints 
Table 5 compares the frequency of capacity restrictions for three groups of firms: those that do not 
seem to be limited by the lack of either internal or external finance (Group 1), those that complain 
about shortages of internal finance but not about inability to raise external finance (Group 2) and, 
finally, those that report being rationed on the market for external finance (Group 3). Whereas only 
12.99% of the first group claims to be capacity restricted, the corresponding figures are 22.52% of the 
second group and 19.17% of the third group. The two latter groups are clearly different from the first 
group. We perform three statistical tests of association: the well known Pearson test, a likelihood ratio 
test and Fisher’s exact test. Given two discrete (multinomial) variables, all three tests focus on how 
strongly the realised shares for one variable, conditional on the values that the other variable may 
take, deviates from the overall shares. Pearson’s test and the likelihood ratio test are easily calculated 
and rely on asymptotic properties of the test statistic: for large numbers their distribution converges 
against the Chi(2) with (r – 1)(s – 1) degrees of freedom, r being the number of rows and s being the 
number of columns in the contingency tables. Fisher’s test exploits the exact distribution of the test 
statistic, but computation can take a very long time for larger tables.
7 All tests reject the null hypothesis 
of independence with a p-value of less than 0.0005. 
It is also interesting to look at changes of states, as the association between the levels of the financial 
constraints and capacity restrictions might be the result of a special sensitivity to constraints in general 
on the part of the individual respondents. To put it differently: some individuals might have a special 
propensity to complain. Therefore we want to condition on the state of capacity restrictions in the 
preceding period. This examination also prepares our duration analysis: by definition, a switch from 
the state of not restricted to restricted initiates a spell of restricted capacity. If the restricted state is 
maintained, the spell goes on, and a reverse switch will end it. 
Table 6 performs the three above-mentioned non-parametric association tests separately for firms that 
reported capacity restrictions in the preceding period and those that did not. Generally, capacity 
restrictions are cited much more frequently when there were restrictions in the previous quarter: 
whereas only 7.2% of the unrestricted firms switch to the restricted state, 53.3% of the restricted firms 
remain restricted. However, under both conditions the probability of capacity restrictions clearly 
becomes higher when financial constraints are present. Again, the three association tests mentioned 
above reject the null hypothesis of independence with a p-value of less than 0.0005. 
3.4  The design of the duration analysis 
The econometric analysis of duration data began only in the late 1970s (see Heckman and Singer 
(1984), Kiefer (1988) and Lancaster (1990) for overviews). Not only the statistical models, but also a 
good part of the terminology have been borrowed from biostatistics. The classical focus of “survival 
analysis” is the evaluation of survival times of human patients or animals after the contraction of a 
specific disease, with the aim of testing the effects of medical treatments and other factors that might 
potentially be of relevance. Among the economic applications have been the analysis of the duration 
of unemployment, for example by Steiner (1990), or of fiscal behaviour, as in the study by von Hagen 
et al (2001). To the best of our knowledge, the duration of capacity constraints has never been 
investigated before at a microeconometric level. This makes our exercise interesting and worthwhile in 
its own right, as capacity constraints may play an important role in the propagation of inflationary 
shocks.
8 
Here, we wish to consider the duration of states of restricted capacity. For a firm in this state, the 
probability of switching to the unrestricted state may depend on the duration that is already achieved. 
Such a conditioning on time is called “ageing”, and the word itself makes the idea plain. Mortality 
among human beings is relatively high during the first months of life, and then drops sharply after a 
couple of years. In advanced age, mortality rises again and reaches extreme levels at the right end of 
the scale. 
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8  See Macklem (1997).  
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In order to estimate survival curves, we therefore need to have information on the time when the 
period of constrained capacity began. We limit ourselves to contiguous strings of observations that 
start with a switch of the capacity restrictions variable from zero (no capacity restrictions reported) to 
one (output is likely to be limited by plant capacity during the next four months). The string is 
interrupted if the state is left, ie the “spell” ends, or else if there is no further information on the firm. 
One missing survey is enough to cut the string off. For inferential reasons, we can use only those 
observations which are not censored immediately after entry. That is, after the initial switch from zero 
to one, we need at least one more consecutive observation on the firm if the string is to contain any 
information on duration other than that it was non-negative. The cleaned CBI survey data for the 
period between January 1989 and November 1999 contain 49,244 observations on 5,169 firms. In this 
data set, we observe 1,431 of such strings, with a total of 5,153 observations,
9 taken from 862 firms. 
We need to pay special attention to three important features of our data set. First, our duration data 
are censored considerably. From our 1,431 cases, we observe the end of the spell 1,210 times, but in 
the remaining 221 spells the string is cut off by missing observations. In these cases, we know that the 
spell has lasted at least until the end of the string, and this information has to be used appropriately. 
Second, we have grouped data. We do not observe the end of the spell in continuous time, but only 
know that it falls in an interval between two discrete points of time. Our observations are quarterly, and 
the vast majority of observed periods of capacity constraints are less than four quarters. This means 
that the granularity of our observations is rather high, and we believe that it would not be correct to use 
standard models and estimation procedures which assume observed duration times to be continuously 
distributed in time. Third, as already stated, we are working with a panel of survival time data. For 
many firms, we observe more than one spell. These cannot be assumed to be stochastically 
independent, and special care has to be taken with testing procedures. 
3.5  Kaplan-Meier survival curves 
We start by looking at the estimated survivor functions. A survivor function is defined for both discrete 
and continuous distributions by the probability that the duration T exceeds a value t in its range, that 
is: 
F(t) = P(T > t),   0 < t < ∞.  (1) 
For each hypothetical duration t, the survivor function gives the share of individuals with duration of t 
or more. In our context, the survivor function depicts the process of firms liberating themselves from 
capacity constraints, once they have entered into this state. It gives the mass on the right tail of the 
distribution of duration times. This is convenient, because the right tail is the important component for 
the incorporation of right censoring. 
The Kaplan-Meier
10 (or product limit) estimator is a non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator of 
the survivor function. The estimator is given by: 
() j
t j
t F λ − =Π
≤





= λ ˆ . (2) 
The index j enumerates observed times to completion, ie time spans passed since the observational 
unit entered into the risk pool. We only observe firms at discrete intervals, therefore the j can be 
thought of as quarters. The  j λ ˆ  are estimated probabilities for the observational unit to complete at j, 
given that it has reached j – 1, the last observed time to completion. The estimate of these conditional 
probabilities is obtained by dividing the observed number of completions, dj, by the number of 
observational units that have neither completed nor been censored before j. 
As can be seen, the survivor function is estimated recursively. The expression  ) ˆ 1 ( λ −  is an estimation 
of the conditional probability that an individual “survives” in the state, given that it has lasted until j – 1. 
                                                       
9  This number of observations includes the initial zero and the initial one for each string. 
10  For the derivation of the Kaplan-Meier estimator as a maximum likelihood estimator, see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002).  
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The unconditional probability that the duration is at least j is then computed as a product of all the 
contemporaneous and prior conditional survival probabilities. For this estimate to be unbiased, the 
censoring mechanism needs to be independent; that is, the completion probabilities of non-censored 
and censored individuals must be identical. This will be assumed throughout below. 
Table 7 not only describes termination and censoring over time, but also gives the numerical values 
for the survivorship and completion rates in the entire sample. The first column, time, is the number of 
quarters after the original switch from unconstrained to constrained. If, for example, the capacity state 
of a firm switches from unrestricted to restricted in the third quarter of 1991, then for this firm the fourth 
quarter of 1991 assumes the value of one. The second column gives the number of firms “at risk”, for 
which we have information in this quarter. The third column gives the number of completions, and the 
fourth column the number of firms censored in this quarter, on which there is no further information 
thereafter. The sixth column is the estimated Kaplan-Meier survivor function, based on the estimated 
hazard rates in the fifth column according to equation (2). According to this estimate, about 40% of 
firms that start out with capacity constraints remain in this state for more than one quarter, 20% for 
more than two quarters, etc. After the fifth quarter, the survivor function has dropped to 6.4%. The 
longest observed duration is completed after 13 quarters. Completion probabilities seem to be falling, 
ie there is negative age dependence. The more time a firm has spent in a state of constrained 
capacity, the less likely it is to leave in the next quarter. The size of the sample, on which duration 
information is based, decreases rapidly with time. After the fifth quarter, not more than 3.7% of the 
original set of firms is left in the sample. It therefore seems inappropriate to draw any conclusions from 
survival times longer than that. The last column gives the standard deviation of the survivor function, 
taking into account the stochastic dependence of the duration experiences for a given firm. The 
standard deviations are simulated on the basis of a maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters 
using 20,000 replications. Numerically, they differ only very slightly from what is obtained assuming all 
duration experiences to be independent.  
Next we wish to look at survival experiences of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. The 
relative sizes of the groups and some global statistics are given in Table 8. The state is measured at 
the  start of the spell. As before, there are two natural ways to analytically distinguish financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. First, we can group a firm as financially constrained if it reports 
that it has to scale down investment because of insufficient internal funds. Second, we can classify it 
as financially constrained if it cites either shortages of internal finance or inability to obtain external 
finance. The difference between the two groupings is in those 44 spells where firms cite the inability to 
obtain external finance as a limitation to investment, without indicating shortages of internal finance at 
the same time. As such a pattern is incompatible with the standard pecking order view of corporate 
finance under financial constraints or the natural ordering that results from costly monitoring models as 
shown in Graph 1, we prefer the less ambivalent first grouping. Ultimately, the answer “costs of 
finance” as a limit to capital expenditure might indicate the working of the classical user cost 
mechanism. Therefore we do not use it as a sorting criterion. 
We see that the prevalence of financial limitations is clearly higher among those firms that cite 
capacity restrictions. Whereas 25.3% of all capacity restriction experiences are categorised as 
“constrained” according to the first criterion, and 28.4% according to the second criterion, the 
corresponding figures for the entire CBI data set are 19.0% and 20.8%, respectively. 
Graph 3 depicts the results for the first criterion (shortage of internal finance) for the whole sample. 
The survival curves for a split along the other criterion look almost the same. The survival curve for 
unconstrained firms is always beneath the curve for the financially constrained firms. This means the 
unconstrained firms are able to complete their spell of restricted capacity faster than the constrained 
firms. It is convenient to point out again that there are two competing causal explanations for this 
difference. For a given size of capacity gap, financially constrained firms might take longer to fill it. On 
the other hand, firms with a huge capacity gap (and accordingly higher financing needs) might be 
more likely to report financial constraints. Comparing the survival curves essentially tests those two 
hypotheses jointly. It will be necessary to examine this difference statistically. 
3.6  A proportional hazard (Cox) model of duration 
In order to test the effect of financial constraints on the duration of capacity restrictions, we need to 
impose some structure. Let x be a vector of characteristics, among them an indicator variable for 
financial constraints at the beginning of the spell. As we have little a priori information about the  
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underlying process, we do not want to restrict the form of the baseline survivor function that 
corresponds to x =  0. In what follows, we explicitly recognise (1) that duration is distributed 
continuously over time, and (2) the measurement of the capacity restrictions for a given unit is taken at 
discrete intervals (quarters), j = 1, 2, … k.
11 Let λ(t, xi) be the hazard for a unit with characteristics xi at 
time t, defined as: 
() ( ) h x t T h t T t P x t i h
, lim ,
0
≥ + < ≤ = λ
→  (3) 
The hazard is the instantaneous rate at which spells are completed by units that have lasted until time 
t, defined in the same way as a mortality rate in demographics or a failure rate in the statistical theory 
of capital stock dynamics. We want to assume that the characteristics x relate to the hazard rate in a 
proportional fashion: 
() ( ) ) exp( , 0 β ′ ⋅ λ = λ i x t x t ,  (4) 
with β being a vector of coefficients that needs to be estimated. The hazard ratio between an individual 
with characteristics xi and the baseline case is given by  ) exp( β ′ i x , which is approximately 1 – β for 
small β. The hazard ratios between two individuals with characteristics x1 and x0 are calculated as 
exp[(x1 – x0)β]. Equation (4) constitutes the model of proportional hazard, developed by Cox (1972). In 
this setup, the baseline hazard remains completely unspecified, which is why the proportional hazard 
model figures among the semi-parametric approaches. 
We assume that the spells of different firms are independent events and that the censoring 
mechanism is independent of the state of the firm. We can write the probability for the completion of a 
spell to be registered after j surveys as a product of conditional probabilities. This allows us to derive a 
likelihood function that contains β as well as further (incidental) parameters describing, for the baseline 
case, the conditional probability of completing in the time interval between j – 1 and j, given that j – 1 
has been reached. For details, see Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999), Section 7.4, as well as Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice (2002), Section 5.8. The likelihood function here can be shown to be identical to that for 
a Bernoulli experiment with probabilities that depend on time as well as on xi by means of a standard 
link function. The parameter estimates are asymptotically normally distributed. We take the panel 
nature of the data into account by computing robust standard errors, with clusters defined by firm 
identity. 
Table 9 contains the maximum likelihood estimations for a Cox model with one covariate, as well as 
dummy variables carrying information on the sector and the time of origin of the spell. As explained 
above, we use two alternative definitions of financial constraints. The dummy variable fin(1) takes a 
value of one to indicate that the firm cites insufficient internal finance at the outset of the spell. The 
dummy variable fin(2) will be one if the firm cites either insufficient internal finance or inability to raise 
external finance. The respective classification is maintained during the entire spell. 
In each cell, the first figure gives the estimated coefficients. Below, in curly brackets, this value is 
translated into a hazard ratio. Column 1, for example, compares the hazard rates for constrained and 
unconstrained firms according to our first criterion. The hazard rate of a constrained firm is   
exp(–0.192) times the hazard ratio of a small firm, meaning that financially constrained firms are 
leaving the state of restricted capacity at a rate which is only about 82.6% that of an unconstrained 
firm. The third figure, in round brackets, indicates the robust standard deviations, taking into account 
stochastic dependence between spells generated by the same firm. The last entry, in square brackets, 
gives the z statistic for statistical significance: under the null hypothesis of no differences, the 
estimated coefficient divided by its standard error is asymptotically a standard normal variate. 
Column  2 gives the corresponding estimates with respect to our second indicator of financial 
constraints, fin(2). The picture is essentially similar. 
                                                       
11  The assumption of absolutely continuous time is made only for expositional convenience. A discrete time concept would not 
invalidate any of our results, after redefining the hazard rate in t as the conditional probability that the spell is completed in 
t + 1, conditional on it having lasted until t. It is possible to conduct duration analysis with distributions of T that have both 
discrete and continuous portions. See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) for a systematic approach.  
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It may be argued that the detected differences may be sector-specific. As financial constraints may be 
sector-specific too, we want to control for sectoral differences in order to avoid a missing variable bias. 
Columns 3 and 4 repeat the estimates explained above, adding 20 dummies for two digit SIC sectors. 
This does not lead to a reduction of the financial constraint effects; if anything, the effect is bigger. 
A third set of estimates, collected in columns 5 and 6, controls for the position in the business cycle by 
including dummies for the time of the start of the spell. This is done in order to account for a possible 
dependence of duration on the general state of the economy. In a time of depression, investors might 
be less inclined to close capacity gaps. At the same time, internal financial resources might be scarcer 
and external finance might be more difficult to obtain. In fact, adding the controls for the business cycle 
situation makes the size effects come out somewhat smaller, as predicted. In our preferred estimate, 
column 5, lack of internal financial resources lowers the hazard rate by about 18% with respect to the 
baseline case. The value is significant at a 1% level (p = 0.006). 
4.  Conclusions and outlook 
Our association and duration analysis have shown that the CBI financial constraints data are not 
without informational content - as theoretically expected, financially constrained firms are more often 
capacity constrained and they take longer to close capacity gaps than unconstrained firms. This 
means we can take our survey data seriously. They indicate that financial constraints and real activity 
are indeed interrelated. Survey information on the ups and downs of financial constraint indicators can 
therefore be a valuable policy tool. 
But the precise nature of that interrelationship is still open. Real investment decisions may certainly 
cause financial constraints, and on the other hand those financial constraints may slow down or 
prevent expansion plans. Further research is planned to separately identify the two directions of 
causation using a structural approach. 
Finally, it will be interesting to take a more differentiated view. Are there subgroups (large firms, for 
example) for which financial constraints matter less? Are high-tech firms or innovators different from 
the rest? What about the importance of the state of the economy? And is it possible to analyse the role 
of the financial system by making international comparisons? Working with individual level survey data 
may be demanding, but, so the author believes, it can be highly rewarding. 
 
Table 1 
Breakdown of data set by employment size  
 Employment  size 
  1-199 200-499  500-4,999  5,000 and 
over  Total 
No  of  firms   3,394   1,060    647    68   5,169 
No of observations  31,089   10,222    6,994  939   49,244 
Source: CBI, Industrial Trends Survey. 
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Table 2 
Number of observations split by  
employment size and two digit SIC code 
Employment size 
Two digit SIC code 
1-199 200-499  500-4,999  5,000 and 
over  Total 
Coke ovens    17    6    17    0    40 
Mineral oil processing    73    35    38    11    157 
Nuclear fuel production    0    0    0    2    2 
Extraction and preparation of 
metalliferous ores   35    0    0   0  35 
Metal manufacturing    1,429    460    292    62    2,243 
Extraction of minerals not elsewhere 
specified   493    60    103    9    665 
Manufacturing of non-metallic mineral 
products   1,286    436    443    85    2,250 
Chemical industries    1,191    722    641    79    2,633 
Production of man-made fibres    142    8    32    1    183 
Manufacturing of metal goods not 
elsewhere specified    3,048    651    308    6    4,013 
Mechanical engineering    7,116   1,718    1,028    23   9,885 
Manufacturing of office machinery and 
data processing   103   26   90   7   226 
Electrical and electronic engineering   2,991   1,420    808    54   5,273 
Manufacturing of motor vehicles and 
parts thereof   691  409   409   187    1,696 
Manufacturing of other transport 
equipment   315  132   136   111   694 
Instrument engineering    838    230    69    0    1,137 
Food, drink and tobacco manufacturing 
industries part 1    473    250    420    43    1,186 
Food, drink and tobacco manufacturing 
industries part 2    689    399    454    151    1,693 
Textile  industries   2,427   1,098    594    7   4,126 
Manufacturing of leather and leather 
goods   295   63   2   0   360 
Footwear and clothing industries    1,439    478    262    39    2,218 
Timber and wooden furniture industries  1,258    313    154    1   1,726 
Manufacturing of paper and paper 
products   2,854    668    489    38   4,049 
Processing of rubber and plastics    1,698    563    169    22    2,452 
Other manufacturing industries    188    77    36    1    302 
Total 31,089    10,222   6,994    939    49,244 
Source: CBI, Industrial Trends Survey.  



















of labour  Other N/a 
Any rank  38.71%  18.89%  4.30%  10.64% 54.88%  5.73% 1.76%  8.89% 
Rank  1  28.14%  13.58% 1.96% 5.25% 44.51%  2.76% 1.58%  9.49% 
Note: Firms ranking the constraint as a limit on capital expenditure authorisations, as a percentage of all firms, including 
those who did not answer the question at all. Respondents were able to give one or more responses, hence results do not 
sum to 100%. 




Variability and persistence of financial constraints 
 Unconstrained  in  t Constrained  in  t Total 


















Note: Number and share of responding firms reporting either a shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external 
finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next 12 months. 
Source: CBI, Industrial Trends Survey. 
 
Table 5 
Association of capacity restrictions and financial constraints 
Capacity restrictions 
 
Not restricted  Restricted  Total 




























Pearson’s test:   Chi2(2) = 431.39   P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) = 389.00  P < 0.0005 
Fisher’s exact test    P < 0.0005 
Note: Number and share of responding firms reporting a shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance as a 
factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next 12 months (rows) and number and share of firms reporting plant capacity 
as likely to limit output over the next four months (columns). 
Source: CBI, Industrial Trends Survey.  
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Table 6 
Association of capacity restrictions and financial constraints  
conditional on state of capacity restrictions in the previous period 
Case 1: No capacity restrictions in previous period 
Capacity restrictions 
 
Not restricted  Restricted  Total 




























Pearson’s test:   Chi2(2) = 137.18   P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) = 124.07  P < 0.0005 
Fisher’s exact test    P < 0.0005 
Case 2: Capacity restrictions in previous period 
Capacity restrictions 
 
Not restricted  Restricted  Total 




























Pearson’s test:   Chi2(2) = 39.47  P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) = 39.76  P < 0.0005 
Fisher’s exact test    P < 0.0005 
Note: Number and share of responding firms reporting a shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance as a 
factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next 12 months (rows) and number and share of firms reporting plant capacity 
as likely to limit output over the next four months (columns). 
Source: CBI, Industrial Trends Survey. 
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Table 7 
Survivor function and completion probabilities  
for the entire sample 
Time  Beg total  Completed  Net lost  Completion 
rates 
Survivor 
function  Std dev 
1 1,431  856 133  0.5982  0.4018  0.0138 
2 442  216 43  0.4887  0.2055  0.0123 
3 183  63 16  0.3443  0.1347  0.0107 
4 104  40 11  0.3846  0.0829  0.0090 
5 53  12 7  0.2264  0.0641  0.0082 
6 34  13 4  0.3824  0.0396  0.0074 
7 17  3 2  0.1765  0.0326  0.0072 
8 12  3 3  0.2500  0.0245  0.0069 




Composition of subsamples 
Subsample  No of experiences  Times at risk  Incidence rates 
All firms  1,431  2,291  0.528 
Shortage of int finance  363  625  0.467 
No shortage of int finance  1,068  1,666  0.551 
Shortage of int or ext finance  407  703  0.472 
No shortage of int or ext finance  1,024  1,588  0.553 
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Table 9 
Maximum likelihood estimation of  
a proportional hazard model with grouped panel data 
Coefficient  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
fin(1) 
















(shortage of internal or 
external finance) 












Duration  time  dummies   9   9   9   9   9   9 
Sector  dummies    –    –   20   20   20   20 
Dummies for time origin 
of  spells   –   –   –   –    41    41 
No of spells 
No of firms 



















Note: Cox duration model with grouped data for spells of capacity constraints, estimated as a binary regression model using 
the complementary log-log function as link function. A spell is classified as pertaining to a financially constrained firm if, at the 
time when the spell starts, the firm reports financial constraints. The dummy variable fin(1) takes a value of one if a firm 
reports a shortage of internal finance in the answer to question 16c, otherwise it is zero. The dummy variable fin(2) takes a 
value of one if the firm reports either a shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance, otherwise it is zero. 
Likewise, a spell is classified as belonging to a large firm if the firm has 200 employees or more at the beginning of the spell. 
One observation had to be dropped because the longest duration interval (13 quarters) predicts the event perfectly. In the 
regressions reported in columns 3 to 6, two more observations and one sector (manufacturing of office machinery and data 
processing) were dropped because the sector dummy predicts the event perfectly. ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Graph 1 
Capital demand and external finance premium 
 
External costs of 
finance
Expected marginal value  
of capital 
Costs of finance 
O  Equity + cash flow Total capital demand 
External finance premium 
Opportunity costs  
of internal finance
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Graph 2 
Kaplan-Meier estimates of the  
survivor function for the entire sample 
  Kaplan-Meier survival estimate
Analysis time










Kaplan-Meier survival curves for  
financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
  Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by financial constraints
Analysis time
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